In recent years, there has been a rising concern about the policy of major search engines. The concern comes from search bias, which refers to the ranking of the results of a keyword search on the basis of some other principle than the sheer relevance. This search bias is also named search non-neutrality. In this paper, we analyze one non-neutral behavior, that is, a behavior that results in a search bias: the payment by content providers to the search engine (aka. side payment) in order to improve the chances to be located and accessed by a user. A game theory-based model is presented where a search engine and two content providers interact strategically, while the aggregated behavior of users is modeled by a demand function.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increasing concern about Google policy, in terms of its search activities, implying the eventuality that this role should be regulated by government authorities. This is the aim of "search engine neutrality" advocates. The concern is about search engine bias, a term used to describe the activities of a search engine exercising its editorial discretion in a manner that advantages its own or affiliated content, which could favor some content wishing to pay to be better ranked, or which could disadvantage rivals. Search bias therefore refers to rankings based on some principle other than automated relevance for users. Within this paper, we focus on this concern, shown by some regulators on those search rankings that benefit the host search engine: for example the European Commission justified its inquiry into Google by a need to investigate if there is a conduct potentially "lowering the ranking of unpaid results" relatively to paid advertisements even in the regular, also called organic, results, as opposed to the sponsored links clearly declared (and presented as such to users) to make money [1] .
Search neutrality advocates need, however, to demonstrate that there is a problem necessitating any of the various prescribed remedies, such as the application of standard merger analysis under the antitrust laws and even the creation of a government-sponsored "public option" for searches [2] .
Problems cited by search neutrality advocates may be broadly classified in two groups: competition law and antitrust problems arising from "non-objective" search results, and social and cultural issues arising from the use that consumers may make with "non-objective" results. This paper is focused on the former group.
As regards the potential competitive harm from search bias, one argument is based on the "essential facilities" doctrine [3] and stresses that popular search engines, Google for instance, act as a "bottleneck" to access of websites by consumers. By using its power to determine which end websites are reached or not, a search engine can effectively exclude nascent websites from both advertising and sales revenue. Another, but related, argument claims that a search engine disadvantages its content rivals by raising their (awareness) costs relatively to its own. By directing search traffic to its own products-e.g., its mail, calendar, and marketplace platforms-a search engine would effectively discriminate against rivals and force those rivals into more expensive substitute distributions channels [4] . The question remains whether a search engine's use of its search algorithm to direct traffic to itself harms competition and consumers [5] .
This paper aims to shed light on the issue of the search bias. Specifically, it focuses on the analysis of the harm that an apparently non-neutral behavior by a search engine may have on content providers and users. The non-neutral behavior we specifically consider here consists in charging a side payment to the content providers in exchange for better search results. Additionally, the paper analyzes the organization of such an industry, specifically, the search engine and content providers incentives for partial and full integration. While the issue of network neutrality has recently been the topic of a very active debate and extensive literature (see [6] and references herein), this paper is to our knowledge one of the few ones dealing with a mathematical modeling and analysis of search neutrality, though this issue may be critical as we have just highlighted above.
Note that we have defined search neutrality by drawing parallelisms with the definition of network neutrality. Net neutrality means that Internet Service providers (ISPs) should charge consumers only once for Internet access, should not favor one content provider over another, and should not charge content providers serviced by competitors for sending information over broadband lines to end users-no matter how much bandwidth that content uses [7] . The debate around net neutrality arose when ISPs complained that major content providers had their traffic flowing through ISP networks-which was resource consuming-but were only paying an access fee to their servicing ISPs. ISPs then threatened to ask side payments to content providers [8] . In a similar fashion, as motivated in the previous paragraphs and for the purposes of our analysis, we define search neutrality as the provision of a search service to the users where the search engine does not request any side payment from the content providers. This paper is structured as follows. Next section describes the scenario to be modeled and presents the details of the baseline (neutral) model, which comprises a search engine without a search bias, and analyzes the corresponding pricing optimization problem of two payper-use content providers. Section 3 models the case where the search engine exhibits a search bias, and computes the related equilibrium of the non-cooperative game played with each content provider. Section 4 compares the outputs obtained in both cases, neutral and non-neutral. Section 5 analyzes the incentives that the search engine and the content providers may have to integrate, and whether an integration is harmful for the users. Section 6 presents numerical results that are represented graphically and discussed in order to gain insight in the different trade-offs at stake. Section 7 presents an alternative model where the search engine post its price before each content provider does, and it discusses the differences between the models.
And finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
Related work
Game theory was originally applied to the analysis of the interaction between economic agents, but more recently has extended towards the interaction between any kind of agents, specifically communications agents. This is the approach of the analysis and design of spectrum sharing [9] and rate adaptation [10] mechanisms in wireless radio networks. Furthermore, there are works that provide a mixed approach whereby both technical and economical decisions are modeled through game theory [11] .
Our approach relates back to the analysis of the economical interactions. The analysis presented in this paper is in fact closely related to previous works on game theory-based models of network neutrality. Reference [12] studies the implications of two types of non-neutral behavior by a monopolistic ISP: charging side payments and multiple service classes provision. Reference [13] analyzes the case of two competitive ISPs and a single content provider, specifically the incentive that each ISP has in charging a side payment. Our work focuses also on the issue of side payment-charged by the search engine, instead of the ISP. However, departing from [13] , in our work the search engine faces no competition from other search engines, while the content providers do. And, as we will see in the body of the paper, the search engine modifies the service that content providers receive when a side payment is charged, which is not the case in the network neutrality analysis in [12] .
Our paper is to our knowledge one of the few ones dealing with a game-theory modeling and analysis of search neutrality. Reference [14] also addresses this research question. However, it focuses on the issue of content ranking-while our focus, as stated above, is on the issue of the side payment. Specifically, reference [14] compares different ranking behaviors of a search engine.
In a neutral ranking, content is ranked based only on its relevance. The paper demonstrates, by means of specific examples, the incentives for the search engine to depart from this neutral behavior in two ways: a first one where the search engine gets a fraction of the add-generated revenue of the ranked content, and a second one where the search engine owns some of the ranked content.
Finally, there are other infomedation scenarios that are receiving increasing interest in the scientific community.
As an example, a news aggregator may increase a reader's propensity to visit the content producer's site, but it may also deprive the latter of traffic that would otherwise flow to their sites [15] . Some conclusions and modeling elements might be reused across this scenario and our scenario-actually, Google plays a predominant role both as a search engine and as a news aggregator.
GENERAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS OF THE NEUTRAL CASE
The scenario modeled in this paper is shown in • Two content providers (CP), which compete in providing paid content to the users, at prices pi(i = 1, 2).
• The search engine (SE), which helps the users in locating the content at the content providers, and in the non-neutral case charges a price q to each CP.
Arrows represent money flows, and are labeled by the corresponding unit price.
In this section, we model the case where there is no side payment from the CPs to the SE, that is, where q = 0 in Fig. 1 . We take this case as the baseline model, so that the search engine non-neutral behavior will be compared with this benchmark/baseline model.
The model builds on a previous contribution by the same authors, where a simpler game model was analyzed [16] .
The model only covered the interaction between one SE and one CP, providing a first approximation to the modeling of a side payment as a non-neutral behavior of a SE. By incorporating the competition between two content providers, this paper not only analyzes a more realistic model comprising an upstream monopoly (the SE) and a dowstream oligopoly (the two CPs), but in addition the extended model allows to analyze the richer relationships between the SE and each CP or both, as section 5 will show.
Users
We model the user preferences by means of a repre-
where xi is the amount of content demanded from CPi and pi is the price charged by CPi. The function U is assumed to be quadratic and strictly concave:
This expression is canonical in microeconomics for modeling the demand of differentiated products in a duopoly [17] . It is widely used in modeling user behavior for the following reasons. First, as it is shown below in (5), it produces the simplest downwards-sloping demand function, i.e. a linear one. Second, it models the demand for products supplied by two competing producers, where the products are not homogeneous; specifically, we assume here that γ > 0, so that the products are substitutable, that is, a price increase in one product causes an increase in the demand of the other one-we will also contemplate that γ = 0, so that the products are independent. The contents supplied by each provider are effectively substitutable goods. And third, it allows the model to abstract from the specific mechanisms that influence the behavior of the users, and to focus on other aspects, like the pricing and side payment of the content providers. The above expression for the utility has been widely used in telecommunications economics; see, for instance, how it has been used for modeling users demand for spectrum offered by oligopolistic wireless service providers in [18] and [19] .
The above function can be expressed in matrix form as We assume that the services provided by the CPs are substitutes or independent, so that γ ≥ 0.
This utility function gives rise to a demand given by
where p = [p1 p2] , which yields a linear dependence p = α − M x, and (4)
provided that quantities and prices are positive. We see that, first, x1 (resp. x2) is linearly decreasing in p1 (resp. p2) and linearly increasing in p2 (resp. p1); and second, the demand functions have the properties of symmetry of cross effects, that is,
In words, the cross effect of a price rise of one service on the demand of the other one is the same as the reciprocal effect.
We can alternatively interpret the demand functions x1 = D1(p1, p2) and x2 = D2(p1, p2) as the total amount of users subscribing to each CP, where p1 (resp. p2) would be the price charged by content provider 1 (resp. 2). We propose that
where η0 denotes the probability (0 < η0 < 1) that the content is located by the search engine and therefore accessed by a user. D0i is the maximum potential level of demand from content provider i, if all content was for free, and provided it was fully advertised by the search engine (η0 = 1). And c is the same coefficient in both expressions due to the symmetry of cross effects. We assume that pi has a effect on the demand Di which is stronger than the cross effect produced produced by pj, j = i; hence, di > c, which implies that d1d2 > c 2 . Note that the latter condition can be shown to be equivalent to β1β2 − γ 2 > 0 that was stated above.
The value of D0i − dipi + cpj can be interpreted as (being proportional to) the probability that a user, given the fact that he has "found" the content, actually subscribes to its service. That decision depends on the prices pi and pj set by the content providers, but also on the user's willingness-to-pay for the service.
The relationship between the two sets of parameters used to describe the demand is derived in Appendix A.1.
Eqs. (7)-(8) can be rewritten in matrix form as
Content providers
We assume, as described in Fig. 1 , that CP i charges a fixed price pi to the users. In the baseline model the CPs are assumed not to incur costs, so that the CPs' profits are given by:
Again, we assume that every piece of content that the users would like to access is stored by both content providers.
However, the content will be located by the users by using the service of the search engine, which means that there is content stored at the CP which may end up not being accessed by the users if the search engine denies mentioning it.
Search engine
The role of the SE is to "help" users reach the content that is relevant to them.
We assume in our baseline model that the SE does not charge any usage-based price to the CPs. However, there is an additional revenue coming from sponsored links (displayed usually at the top and/or at the right of the regular/organic links), and which can reasonably be assumed to be proportional to the demand level. Indeed, users subscribing to a CP can be seen from the SE point of view as "satisfied" by the SE results, hence more likely to use that SE again and yield revenues through the sponsored links. Thus,
with λ > 0 the coefficient giving the revenue per subscriber to the CPs' service, coming from sponsored links. Therefore in the baseline model more demand at the CP level will give more revenue to the SE.
Solution
Given that the parameters D0i, η0, di, c and λ are fixed, the only decision variables in this baseline model are the CPs' prices pi. Each CP will charge a price p (n) i so as to maximize its profits Πc,i. The analysis framework is that of non-cooperative game theory [20] , and the equilibrium concept that of Nash equilibrium, which is a strategy profile (p (n) 1 , p (n) 2 ) such that no player can unilaterally increase its profits through a price change.
Since the profit functions of the CPs (Πc,i) are clearly concave and continuously differentiable, the equilibrium is reached when the first order conditions (FOCs)
are simultaneously fulfilled, giving as solutions
Now, we define D
. After some algebra we obtain:
NON-NEUTRAL MODEL
The neutral case being solved, we now focus on the nonneutral behavior of a SE implementing side payments q from each CP to the SE. The effect of the side payment is two-fold:
• Paying q to the SE will increase the chances that
CPi's content is located and accessed by the users, when users decide to use the SE. We model this effect through an increasing function η1(q).
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• The more the SE charges to the CP, the less the users trust the search results because the search bias will increase and the reputation of the SE will decrease, and the less likely they will use the SE. We model this reputation effect through a decreasing function η2(q).
As a consequence, the overall probability η0 that a CP is seen by a user in the baseline model is proposed to be replaced here by a function
taking into account the positive and negative consequences of side payments commented above.
We will also assume
so that a CP not paying any charge to the SE will reasonably be such that the model comes down to the baseline/neutral case. In the non-neutral case though, the SE could play with η1 to impose η(0) < η0 to enforce the CP to pay. This (other) case is left for further research; but would not add any major change to the analysis.
Taking into account the side payment, the demand functions Di and the profits Πc,i and Πs are now given by:
Note that these expressions generalize (10), (12) , and (13) .
And that we also assume that the cross effects in D1 and D2 are symmetric, as stated in (6) for the neutral model.
The relationship between the two sets of parameters used to describe the demand for the non-neutral model is
Some remarks follow with respect to the purpose and the scope of the non-neutral model presented in this section:
• The SE departs from the neutral behavior described in the previous section insofar as it modulates the content demand function by a function η which is not only dependent on an objective ranking algorithm-as in the neutral case, but also on a side payment q. • The side payment is assumed to be a tax levied by the SE in a non-discriminatory manner. Therefore, the SE is not assumed to play with a discriminatory qi in order to drive demand from one CP to the other one. In a similar fashion, no CP is assumed to choose a qi in order to drive demand from the competing CP.
• The function η(·) therefore influences the overall demand faced by the two CPs. It aims to model a potential dead weight loss that the side payment may cause on the welfare of the operators and of the users. An interpretation may be that a low η value would drive demand out from the CPs, while a high η would drive demand back to the CPs.
Solution
Given η(·) and the parameters D0i, di, c and λ, each of the two CPs and the SE interact strategically and noncooperatively in order to maximize their respective profits.
That is, each CP will charge a price pi so as to maximize its profits Πc,i, and simultaneously the SE will charge a side payment q so as to maximize its profits Πs. Again, we search for a Nash equilibrium (p (nn) 1 , p (nn) 2 , q * ). Although we assume that prices are chosen simultaneously, what is relevant for the analysis is not the timing of the decisions but the fact that each player makes its choice without the knowledge of the other players' choices.
The simultaneous-move assumption is commonplace in economic modeling, however an alternative assumption will be discussed in Section 7.
Again, since the profit functions of the CPs (Πc,i) are concave and continuously differentiable, we search the equilibrium prices by solving the FOCs. Given a strategy q of the SE, the FOCs can now be written as
And for the SE, differentiating with respect to q and equating to zero, we get
We assume that either D01 − d1p1 + cp2 > 0 or D02 − d2p2 + cp1 > 0, or both (otherwise the SE gets nothing).
Then, ∂Πs ∂q is of the same sign as η(q) + η (q)(q + λ). Additionally, the solution to (27), q * > 0, should lead to a better performance, in terms of probability for a CP to be visited, with respect to the neutral case, so that the non-neutral service is seen as an enhanced service for the CP. That is,
We propose the following expressions for η1(q) and η2(q):
These expressions comply with the desired behavior and assumptions, and they remain tractable in the analysis that is conducted hereafter. Specifically, first, η1(q) is increasing and η2(q) is decreasing. Second, the condition in (22) is satisfied. And, third, the requirement (28) is met as long as η0 < 1/2-taking into account the fact that η1(q)η2(q) is decreasing when q > 1 − 2η0. This may be interpreted as requiring that the visibility of the content in the neutral case be low enough.
Substituting (29) and (30) in (27), we get
After some algebra and bearing in mind that η0 < 1/2, the above inequality can be rewritten as
which is satisfied if and only if
Analogously to the neutral case, p (nn) 
. And we define η * = η(q * ). After some algebra we obtain:
It would remain to prove that, given (p (nn) 1 , p (nn) 2 ), q * is a maximum of Πs, which we do next. From (31) and (32) it follows that q * > 0. Besides,
Thus, we conclude that Πs reaches a global maximum at q = q * .
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE NEUTRAL AND NON-NEUTRAL CASES
In this section, the outcomes for the users, the CPs and the SE in the non-neutral case is compared with the baseline case, and constraints on the values of the parameters providing better output thanks to non-neutrality are derived.
Profits
We first focus on the CPs profits Πc,i, and the SE profits Πs. Dealing with (18)- (20) and with (34)-(37), the following conditions are obtained:
Content providers:
Search engine:
In the rest of the section, we will consider the case in which both CPs have the same characteristics, so that expressions would allow to gain an insight. Notation can be simplified as d1 = d2 = d and D01 = D02 = D0. We have checked that the non-symmetric case does not add value to the conclusions.
For the neutral case,
And for the non-neutral case,
Thus, the conditions for improvement under non-neutral behavior become the following ones:
On the minimum value of λ. In the following paragraphs, we derive the restrictions that C1 imposes on λ.
Note that the right-hand side of the inequality in C1 is decreasing in λ. This follows from the two facts:
Therefore, for a given value of D0/(d − c), condition C1 is equivalent to imposing a minimum value for λ. Furthermore, the lower D0/(d − c), the higher that minimum value will be. This may be interpreted as requiring that the SE, in the absence of side payments, get a minimum revenue from the user demand for content.
Conversely, for a given λ, C1 gives a lower bound for D0/(d − c), and the higher λ, the less restrictive that lower bound is. Likewise, this may be interpreted as requiring that the users be willing to pay a minimum amount for the service.
Consumer surplus
Another outcome to compare is the consumer surplus, representing the aggregated value that users get from the whole service. We compute the consumer surplus as [17] [21]
where again x = [D1 D2] is the column vector of actual demands and p = [p1 p2] that of the prices. The consumer surplus (aka. Marshallian consumer surplus) at the equilibrium price p is computed as the integral of the demand curve between p and the price which sets the demand to zero. When the expression of the utility is of the quasilinear type, as it is our case (U (x1, x2) − p1x1 − p2x2), the consumer surplus ends up being equal to the value of the utility at the optimum quantities, and it gives a money-metric utility measure at these quantities.
As such, the consumer surplus is an equivalent measure to the producer's profit.
Eq. (52) can be rewritten, using (2) and (4), as
in the case of symmetric CPs, from (66) and (67),
Now, from (43) and (47) it easily follows that CS (nn) >
which is the same condition as in (50) Finally, from (50), (51), and (56) it follows that, in the symmetric case,
DOWNSTREAM INTEGRATION
In the previous sections, the CPs are assumed to act independently from each other and from the SE. In this section, we analyze the scenarios that arise when the SE integrates downstream, that is, when the SE is integrated with one CP and when the SE is integrated with both CPs.
We call these scenarios "vertical integration" and "industry integration", respectively.
The models analyzed in this section build on the non-neutral model presented in Section 3, and on the assumptions made there, that is, that the cross effects in D1 and D2 are symmetric.
Vertical integration
First, the case where the SE integrates with CP2 is analyzed. Given η(·) and the parameters D0i, di, c and λ, CP1 and SE+CP2 interact strategically and noncooperatively in order to maximize their respective profits.
That is, CP1 will charge a price p1 so as to maximize its profits Πc,1, and simultaneously SE+CP2 will charge a side payment q and a price p2 so as to maximize its joint profit Π = Πs + Πc,2 = (λ + q)D1 + (λ + p2)D2. (58)
We search for a Nash equilibrium (p (vi) 1 , p (vi) 2 , q (vi) ) by solving the optimization problems
The detailed derivation of the solution is given in Appendix B.2.
Industry integration
The case where the SE integrates with both CP1 and CP2 is now analyzed. Given η(·) and the parameters D0i, di, c and λ, the SE+CP1+CP2 takes an optimal decision in order to maximize its joint profits. That is, the SE+CP1+CP2 will We now search for the values (p (ii) 1 , p (ii) 2 , q (ii) ) that are the solution to
The detailed derivation of the solution is given in Appendix B.1.
NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the results derived above analytically are computed numerically and represented graphically in order to gain insight in the different tradeoffs at stake, and the results are discussed. In Section 6.1 the outcome for each stakeholder is computed for the neutral and nonneutral cases. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 analyze the incentives for integration in the vertical integration and industry integration cases, respectively.
Neutral vs. non-neutral cases
The outcome for each stakeholder is computed for the neutral and non-neutral cases, and the influence of each parameter is analyzed.
On the conditions C1 and C2. In Fig. 2 , the domains such that conditions C1 and C2 hold are represented as a function of λ.
First, note that the graph represents the right-hand side of each inequality in (50) and (51) as a function of the parameter λ, and each pair of curves is generated with a different value for the parameter η0. And second, the represented range of λ complies with (32).
Note that C1 is indeed the most constraining condition (as proved previously), since the threshold curve lies above that of C2 for every value of η0. Also the graph demonstrates that there is a wide range of values for D0/(d − c) and λ such that C2 holds but C1 does not, i.e., where the SE is better off but both the CP and the users are harmed with a non-neutral SE.
On the values of Πc, Πs and CS. In Fig. 3 , As expected from conditions C1 and C2 and the above discussion of Fig. 2 , for low values of η0, all stakeholders are better off in the non-neutral case. As η0 increases, the first stakeholders to be harmed are the users and the CPs, while the SE remains as the only stakeholder to take profit from the search bias for high values of η0. 
Vertical integration incentives
We are interested in assessing whether both the SE and and η0 = 0.2. Following Section 3, and specifically (67) in Appendix A.2, we define the degree of substitution σ γ 2 /(β1β2) = c 2 /(d1d2) [17] , which measures how substitutable contents provided by CP1 and by CP2 are, ranging from 0 (independent contents) to 1 (perfect substitutes). In our setting, c takes values between 0.5 and 4.9, so that σ varies from 0.01 to 0.97. c,1 and Π (vi) c,1 ) are also shown. Finally, the consumer surpluses for the non-neutral case and vertical integration (CS (nn) and CS (vi) ) are also represented. Fig. 5 shows the equilibrium prices charged by the CP1 and the CP2 in the two cases (p (nn) i and p (vi) i ). The equilibrium price charged by the SE (q * and q (vi) ) is also represented.
First, Fig. 4 shows that Π (vi) s + Π (vi) c,2 is higher than
c,2 . Additionally, as far as the situation of CP2 is concerned, although Πc,2 is reduced, CP1 gets a larger reduction in profits than CP2 when the vertical integration of SE and CP2 takes place. Second, Fig. 5 shows that all prices p1, p2, q are reduced when SE and CP2 integrates.
And that CP2 fixes a lower equilibrium price p (vi) 2 than the corresponding p (vi)
1 . Third, as regards the users, Fig. 4 shows that CS (vi) > CS (nn) . And finally, as σ increases, the profits difference between the two cases-but also the consumer surplus difference-gets smaller. We have checked that similar observations are obtained when λ and η0 are varied, and when D01, D02, d1 and d2 are varied independently, departing from the above symmetric scenario.
We may conclude that the SE and the CP2 have incentives to integrate. When the contents from each CP are close substitutes, these incentives get reduced, and in the limit, SE and CP2 are indifferent between integrating or not.
Industry integration incentives
We are now interested in assessing whether the SE and the two CPs have any incentives to integrate, as modeled in section 5.2. In Figs. 6 and 7 the parameters take the same values as in the previous subsection. Fig. 6 shows the overall profits (Πs + Πc,1 + Πc,2) for the non-neutral (Π (nn) ), vertical integration (Π (vi) ) and industry integration (Π (ii) ) cases. Accordingly, the consumer surplus in each of the three cases (CS (nn) , CS (vi) , CS (ii) ) is also represented. Fig. 7 shows the values for the prices charged by the CP1 and the CP2 in each case. The side payment charged by the SE is also represented.
First, Fig. 6 shows that, as expected, Π (ii) is greater than Π (vi) and Π (nn) (note that SE+CP1+CP2 always has the option to choose the prices that match either Π (vi) or Π (nn) ). is different in each of the following three intervals:
Furthermore, as σ increases beyond σ th 2 , the profits advantage in the industry integration case increases with respect to the other two cases. Analogously, the consumer surplus deterioration also increases beyond σ th 2 . Second, Fig. 7 shows that the equilibrium price p (ii) i charged by the CPs increases beyond the prices charged in the previous two cases.
We have also checked that similar observations are obtained when λ and η0 are varied, and when D01, D02, d1 and d2 are varied independently, departing from the above symmetric scenario.
We may conclude that the three operators have always an incentive to integrate. And that the incentives, for a degree of substitution σ larger than a threshold, become very large. Note that when contents are close substitutes, the benefit that the operators get from cooperation-i.e., from avoiding competition-is greater than otherwise. On the other hand, the users will be worse off when contents are close substitutes.
STACKELBERG MODEL
In previous sections, we assumed that both CPs and the SE choose their respective prices in a simultaneous way. In this section, we model a situation where the SE chooses the side payment q, and the CPs, knowing this value, choose their respective prices p1 and p2. This game model is of a sequential-move type, it involves two stages and it is commonly known as Stackelberg model [20] . We argue that it is realistic that the SE, which is to some extent providing an upstream or wholesale service to the content providers, posts its price, and then the CPs, which are providing a retail service to the users, post their respective prices with the knowledge of the SE's price.
In this section, we describe the Stackelberg model for the non-neutral cases and the vertical integration cases.
Note that the Stackelberg model does not apply to neither the neutral case-since there is no side payment to postnor to the industry integration case-since there is only one player.
We have produced numerical results for the profits and the consumer surplus, using the same parameters as in Section 6, and we have checked that there is a negligible difference between the simultaneous-move and the Stackelberg models. Thus, no graphics is represented for the Stackelberg model.
Stackelberg model for the non-neutral case
As in Section 3, each of the two CPs and the SE interact strategically and non-cooperatively in order to maximize their respective profits. That is, each CPi will charge a price pi so as to maximize its profits Πc,i, and the SE will charge a side payment q so as to maximize its profits Πs.
However, in this Stackelberg model, the SE posts the side payment q in a first stage, and, in a second stage, each CP chooses simultaneously its respective price p1 and p2, with the knowledge of q. Formally, the equilibrium concept here is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium [20] . We denote the equilibrium values (p (nns) 1 , p (nns) 2 , q (nns) ).
The detailed derivation of the solution is given in Appendix B.3.
Stackelberg model for the vertical integration case
As in Section 6.2, CP1 and SE+CP2 interact strategically and non-cooperatively in order to maximize their respective profits. That is, CP1 will charge a price p1 so as to maximize its profits Πc,1, and SE+CP2 will charge a side payment q and a price p2 so as to maximize its joint profit Π = Πs + Πc,2 However, in this Stackelberg model, the SE+CP2 chooses the side payment q in a first stage, and, in a second stage, CP1 chooses its price p1 and simultaneously SE+CP2 chooses p2, with the knowledge of q. Again, the equilibrium concept here is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We denote the equilibrium values (p (vis) 1 , p (vis) 2 , q (vis) ). The detailed derivation of the solution is given in Appendix B.4.
CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the interaction of a search engine and two content providers when the former exhibits a nonneutral behavior consisting in receiving a side payment in exchange for a search service improvement. We have also analyzed the incentives for the three operators to integrate, and the effect the integration would have on the users.
We have analyzed a model where the pricing decisions are taken simultaneously by every agent, that is, search engine and content providers. Additionally, we have analyzed an alternative model where the search engine posts first its side payment and then each one of the other agents, where applicable, chooses its price; and we have checked that the solutions differ in a negligible amount.
As regards the analysis of the non-neutral behavior, we conclude that under certain conditions, a side payment by the content provider to the search engine is beneficial for all stakeholders, since:
• the users are better off, which means that the improvement achieved by the increase in the likeliness to find the content compensates for the increase in the content price: more users "see" the content, and despite the fact that the price increases, the number of subscribers increases;
• the content providers benefit from a better visibility, allowing it to increase the subscription price to cover the payments to the search engine;
• and the search engine benefits from the increase in either the demand or the side payment, or in both.
Note that this win-win situation depends on the characteristics of the user demand, through the maximum tolerable price over the population; on the quality of the search activity; and on the fraction of SE profits that depends on the users demand but is independent of the side payment. As we have seen, for this situation to occur, it is required that:
• users be willing to pay a sufficient amount for the service,
• without side payments, the SE gets a sufficient revenue out of user demand for content, • the visibility of the content in the neutral situation is low enough.
When this win-win situation is not achieved, the users and the CPs are the first stakeholders to suffer from non-neutral search activity.
The above results would support, absent this win-win situation, what the search engine neutrality advocates claim: that ex-ante regulatory measures should be put in place, i.e., side payments should not be allowed.
As regards the analysis of the different integration scenarios, we conclude that:
• There is an incentive for the SE and one CP to integrate; and the users would be better off if the integration took place. The relationship between the parameter set α1, α2, β1, β2, γ, used in (1), and η0, D01, D02, c, d1, d2 in (7)-(8) can be obtained from (5) , as follows,
and D01
A.2. Non-neutral case
In a similar fashion, the relationship between the parameter set α1, α2, β1, β2, γ, used in (1), and η(q), D01, D02, c, d1, d2 in (23) can be obtained from (5), as follows,
Note that M depends on q, and thus it is different from the one in the neutral scenario.
B. DETAILED SOLUTIONS B.1. Industry integration Nash equilibrium
Let us refer as S to the set defined by the constraints in (65). It is evident that Π(p1, p2, q) is continuously differentiable on S.
Also, it is easy to check that η(q), and thus also Π as a function of q, is decreasing for q > 1 − 2η0. Therefore, we can choose a value q u > 1 − 2η0 such that if we add the restriction q ≤ q u to those in (65) they define a compact set; let us refer to this set as S .
Furthermore, if (p1, p2, q) ∈ S S we have that Π(p1, p2, q u ) > Π(p1, p2, q).
Consequently, the maximum of Π on S , which is guaranteed to exist, is also maximum of Π on S. Thus, the point (p (ii) 1 , p (ii) 2 , q (ii) ) will be among those that satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the problem in (64)-(65).
We next present the solutions of the KKT conditions.
First, let us define
and assume, without any loss of generality, that λ 1 ≤ λ 2 .
Then, it easily follows that λ 1 ≤ λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ λ 2 .
It can be shown there is only one point satisfying the KTT conditions, which is therefore the global maximum.
Moreover, if the value of λ is low enough (as long as condition (32) is met) the maximum is attained at an interior point:
Then, as λ grows (while keeping the rest of the parameters constant) the values of p (ii) 1 and p (ii) 2 decrease until, first, p1 = 0, and second, p2 = 0. This behavior can be interpreted as follows. When λ increases, it is more profitable to lower the prices charged by the content since this raises demand, and the increase in the profit from sponsored links outweighs the profit loss from content. In the limit, if λ is high enough, it is preferable not to charge at all for the content and get all the profit from advertising.
The results obtained from the analysis of the KKT conditions can be summarized as follows:
(73)
B.2. Vertical integration Nash equilibrium
With regard to the maximization of Πc,1 (see (59)), it can be easily checked that, if the feasibility region is not empty,
then the maximum is attained at
Now we turn our attention to the maximization problem for Π (see (61)).
We begin by noting that
and
By using these two observations, we can proceed in much the same way as we did in B.1 so as to show that Π attains a global maximum in the feasibility region defined by (62); actually, in a compact subset of it.
From the analysis of the KKT conditions we obtained that there are two types of candidates to be the maximum:
2 , q (1) ) and y (2) = (p
1 , 0, q (2) ). The first of them is an interior point, while for the second p2 = 0. We now characterize each of the two solution types.
Solution y (1) . From
or with a simplified notation,
The definition of A1, A2, B1, B2 is easily obtained by comparing (76) and (77).
Substituting (77) into (23) yields
where E1
and F1
Now, from ∂Π/∂q = 0,
and substituting (77) and (78) into (81) gives the following cubic polynomial equation
where a3 = −A2E2, (83)
To get y (1) we first obtain q (1) by solving numerically (82), which is then substituted into (77) to obtain (p
2 ). Note that from the real roots of (82) we must discard those that do not give rise to a feasible solution. In other words, the obtained y (1) must satisfy the constraints in (62) and (74).
Solution y (2) In the same way as above, we obtain that
and q (2) is a root of
where
Now, we filter the roots of (89) by requiring y (2) to
The fact that if λ exceeds a certain threshold the maximum for Π is attained at point where p2 has a similar interpretation to that given in Sect. B.1.
Although we have not been able to establish this mathematically, we conjecture that, for each set of values of the parameters, the KKT yield exactly one feasible candidate. That is, either there is one feasible solution of type y (1) and none of type y (2) , or vice versa. This has been the case in all of our numerical experiments.
B.3. Solution of the Stackelberg model for the non-neutral case
The maximization problems faced by CP1 and CP2 have the same FOCs as in Section 3 (see (26)). From these we obtain p1(q) and p2(q), that is, the price p1 (resp. p2) that, for a given value of the side payment q, maximizes the profit of CP1 (resp. CP2). We then substitute p1(q) and p2(q) into the profit of the search engine, so that it becomes a function solely of the variable q Πs(q) = Πs(p1(q), p2(q), q).
The value q (nns) that maximizes Πs(q) is now sought by solving the FOC Π s (q) = 0, which after some algebra becomes the cubic polynomial equation
where a1 = 2λ + 2η0 − λη0 − b(λ + η0 − 2) (96)
We obtain q (nns) as the solution to (95) (after discarding the roots that do not give rise to feasible solutions). Then the prices charged by the CPs in the equilibrium are obtained as p (nns) = p1(q (nns) ) and p (nns) = p2(q (nns) ).
In this subsection we have restricted to derive the equations for the case in which the equilibrium is reached at an interior point. The conditions for this to occur and the equations for the other cases can be derived in a similar fashion as in B.1 and B.2.
B.4. Solution of the Stackelberg model for the vertical integration case
Here we proceed in much the same way as in Sect. B.3.
From the FOCs we obtain the prices p1 and p2 as functions of the side payment q; the expressions for p1(q) and p2(q) are given in Eqs. (76) and (77). Then we substitute p1(q) and p2(q) into the profit of SE+CP2, so that it becomes a function solely of the variable q, Π(q). The value of q (vis) is then obtained by solving the FOC Π (q) = 0, which becomes the cubic polynomial equation
where a3 = cA2 − d1, 
and E1, E2, F1, F2 are given in Eqs. (77)-(80). Finally, q (vis) is the solution to (99) (after discarding the roots that do not give rise to feasible solutions), and then p (vis) = p1(q (vis) ) and p (nns) = p2(q (vis) ).
As in the previous subsection, we have restricted to the case in which the equilibrium is reached at an interior point. The conditions for this to occur and the equations for the other cases can be derived in a similar fashion as in B.1 and B.2. 
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